epiphenomenalism

n. theory that consciousness is a secondary creation of physiological processes

In philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism is a view according to which some or all mental states are mere epiphenomena (side-effects or by-products) of physical states of the world. Thus, epiphenomenalism denies that the mind (as in its states, not its processing) has any causal influence on the body or any other part of the physical world: while mental states are caused by physical states, mental states do not have any causal influence on physical states. Some versions of epiphenomenalism claim that all mental states are causally inert, while others claim that only some mental states are causally inert. The latter version often claims that only those types of mental states that are especially difficult to account for scientifically are epiphenomenal, such as qualitative mental states (e.g., the sensation of pain).
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The doctrine that mental phenomena are not causal despite the fact they may seem to be.
<Discussion> <References> Chris Eliasmith

epiphenomenalism
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